I want to thank the JOFA Journal for the invitation to discuss the important issue of serara as it pertains to women. A few introductory remarks are in order.
First, serara, or holding a position that allows for coercive power, while considered by most of us to be desirable in the course of one’s career path, has never been viewed that way in the totality of Jewish sources. In fact, a large number of texts that discuss serara either advise against pursuing it at all or speak ill of it once achieved—because of the toll it takes on the individual placed in that position; because of the possibility of corruption, both purposeful and accidental; or because of the damage it inevitably does to one’s reputation to be “in charge.”1 Perhaps it all goes back to the biblical and rabbinic ideal that we are all servants to God and not servants to other people, who, after all, are also the Creator’s servants.2 Occupying a position that stands between God and His people makes the person with serara into someone whose existence, by its very nature, contains elements of idolatry, as it inserts a new power into the universe other than that of the Creator.3 I hasten to add that these sources are not a collection of apologetic texts written to explain away the possible halakhic limitations on women, but are about anyone (and frequently specifically about men) occupying or thinking of taking on serara. 4
Certainly serara is necessary in some instances for society and religion to function appropriately, but as we discuss the halakhic parameters of serara, we should keep in mind that our tradition approaches this concept with something of a jaundiced eye. Before embracing any halakhic approach that allows for serara, or any professional or voluntary position that grants some measure of coercive power, one should take at least a moment’s pause to reflect on the hesitations that our tradition expresses about the entire enterprise.5
Second, it is worth noting that the issue of serara and women was joined in earnest with the coming of the contemporary State of Israel. From women’s suffrage 6 to the political leadership of Golda Meir 7 to the desire of some women to serve on regional governing councils,8 the very immediate question of women’s substantive involvement in the political process in the Jewish state made this a real-time concern. Unlike most of the experiences of our ancestors in the lands of their dispersion, where Jews (and certainly Jewish women) were often precluded from holding positions of power, with the birth of the State of Israel, a new reality, of necessity, brought a great deal of halakhic discussion in its wake.9 As so often with hotbutton issues, this led to a great deal of creativity in the analysis of our sources. Some of this was well situated within the parameters of earlier discussions of woman’s roles in positions of power, while others, though well meaning, went far beyond the bounds of earlier sources— some in presenting restrictive positions10 and some in presenting more permissive approaches.11
Biblical and Rabbinic Texts
Moving now to the substance of our inquiry, I would observe that historically, in the opinion of the vast majority of poskim, women may not occupy a position involving serara as part of its job description or performance. Despite some attempts to interpret the oldest sources on the subject as not objecting to serara by women,12 the weight of our jurisprudential tradition has been very heavily on the side of seeing a prohibition against women being allowed to exercise serara. I do not believe that attempting to undermine the existence of that prohibition is a legitimate Orthodox halakhic approach to this question.13
That said, the parameters and criteria that define serara and, consequently, which professions and/or volunteer opportunities in today’s society—e.g., rabbi, synagogue president, head of state, CEO, committee chair, or mashgihah (kashrut supervisor)—are actually closed to women are very much an issue on which different positions can and do exist. It is here that one may find legitimate opinions allowing for women to occupy a number of these roles.
Ultimately, these decisions will depend on which elements are intrinsic parts of the halakhic conceptualization of serara. Once these elements are determined, they can be used as measuring rods to see what does and does not evoke concerns of serara. As always, the analysis of this question must be done as objectively as possible, before taking into account the feelings of women and others who might be limited in their serara roles and then determining how they might be accommodated within the structure of halakha. 14
Turning to our earliest sources, we read in the Bible in Deuteronomy 17:15, 20 (the underlined words are critical to our analysis):
שֹום ּתָׂשִ ים עָלֶיָך מֶלְֶך אֲׁשֶ ר יִבְחַר יְקֹוָק אֱֹלהֶיָך ּבֹו מִּקֶרֶב ַאחֶיָך ּתָׂשִ ים עָלֶיָך מֶלְֶך ֹלא תּוכַל לָתֵת עָלֶיָך אִיׁש נָכְרִי אֲׁשֶר ֹלא ָאחִיָך הּוא לְבִלְּתִי רּום לְבָבֹו מֵאֶחָיו ּולְבִלְּתִי סּור מִן הַּמִצְוָה יָמִין ּוׂשְ מֹאול לְמַעַן יַאֲרִיְך יָמִים עַל מַמְלַכְּתֹו הּוא ּובָנָיו ּבְקֶרֶב יִׂשְ רָאֵל
You shall set him king over you, whom the Lord your God shall choose; one from among your brothers shall you set king over you; you may not set a stranger over you, who is not your brother… That his heart be not lifted up above his brothers, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left; to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he, and his children, in the midst of Israel.
The Sifrei, in commenting on these verses, says:15
שום תשים … מלך, ולא מלכה… מיכן אמרו האיש ממנים פרנס על הציבור ואין ממנים האשה פרנסת על הצבור
You shall set him … king but not queen … from here they said that a man may be appointed to a position of authority over the community while a woman may not be appointed to a position of authority over the community.
The Babylonian Talmud adds:16
דאמר מר שום תשים עליך מלך, כל משימות שאתה משים – אל יהו אלא מקרב אחיך! האי כיון דאמו מישראל, מקרב אחיך קרינן ביה
As the Master said: You shall set him king over you, all appointments that you make shall only be from the midst of your brethren. This one, since his mother is from Israel we still refer to him as “from among your brothers.”
This text, which appears in two places in the Gemara, suggests a connection between women and converts such that the restrictions on serving in serara positions for one is the same as for the other, as the same verse provides the limitations for both.17 Included in the positions prohibited by these texts for converts and women are tax collectors, town administrators, charity trustees, and similar appointments.18
Rambam codifies this and says:19
אין מעמידין מלך מקהל גרים … עד שתהיה אמו מישראל, שנאמר לא תוכל לתת עליך איש נכרי אשר לא אחיך הוא, ולא למלכות בלבד אלא לכל שררות שבישראל, … ואין צריך לומר דיין או נשיא שלא יהא אלא מישראל, שנאמר מקרב אחיך תשים עליך מלך כל משימות שאתה משים לא יהו אלא מקרב אחיך אין מעמידין אשה במלכות שנאמר עליך מלך ולא מלכה, וכן כל משימות שבישראל אין ממנים בהם אלא איש
We do not appoint a king from a community of converts … until his mother is a Jewess, as it says: You may not place a foreigner who is not from your brethren over you. And not just kingship alone, but also any authority position in Israel … certainly a judge or a patriarch must come only from Israel, as it says from among your brethren place a king upon you. All “placings” that “you place” shall not be except from among your brethren.
We do not establish a woman in the position of ruler as it says, a “king and not a queen,” and so too any “placings” in Israel, we only appoint a man.
It is very difficult, in view of these sources, to deny that there are at least some restrictions on women and converts when it comes to their occupying positions of authority.20
Nonetheless, challenges to an absolute prohibition in this regard appear from as early as the Tanakh itself. Most of us are familiar with Deborah the Prophet,21 who is introduced in biblical literature with the words:22
ודְבֹורָה אִּׁשָ ה נְבִיָאה אֵׁשֶ ת לַּפִידֹות הִיא ׁשֹפְטָה אֶת יִׂשְ רָאֵל ּבָעֵת הַהִיא
And Deborah, a female Prophet, the wife of Lapidot, she judged Israel at that time.
So, too, in two places in Tanakh we read about Athalia, a female ruler:23
וַעֲתַלְיָה מֹלֶכֶת עַל הָָארֶץ
But Athalia rules over the land.
This challenge to an absolute prohibition of women as rulers is compounded in rabbinic literature by the mention, without any indication of a halakhic problem, of Shlomzion the Queen,24 Hilni the Queen,25 and Barzila the Queen,26 all of whom served in positions that the halakhic texts would seem to preclude.
Dealing with the Contradictions
Beginning with the medieval period, important Jewish scholars have attempted to deal with the contradictions posed by these sources and the presence of these women of power. Generally, they have explained the contradiction by saying that serara involves something that these women (usually the conversation is about Deborah) did not have, which is why they were accepted in their positions. These discussions open the door to analyzing whether contemporary positions of authority meet these criteria and, therefore, whether women and converts may occupy them.
We begin with the most obvious item, given our working definition of serara as coercive power: the definition of serara as “coercive power” itself. Assuming that women are precluded only from a position that grants them the ability to compel people to act, then one can easily say that positions such as synagogue presidents or committee chairs may be women—as, often to their chagrin, synagogue presidents and committee chairs do not have the power to compel anyone to do anything. A head of state, on the other hand, would seem to be different. Certainly most heads of state can order at least some people under some circumstances to do their bidding, even in a democratically constituted state with constitutionally limited powers. For example, the president of the United States is called the “commander in chief” for reasons of his or her substantive authority over the military, not just as some ceremonial honorific. At first blush, it might appear, then, that women should be precluded from that type of position.
R. Moshe Feinstein uses this criterion of coercive power in his permissive discussion of a women serving as mashgihah or kashrut supervisor.27 Even though a person in that position appears to be able to compel a store owner to remove a questionable item from the store, that power exists only because she serves as the agent for the rabbis who run the kosher supervising agency. Further, she has no discretion in enforcing that power; she cannot, for example, legitimately decide to allow the store owner to make an exception and sell a particular questionable product. This lack of discretion makes the mashgihah different from the Talmudic tax collectors or charity administrators, who derived their power from the government or the community, respectively, but had considerable discretion in applying that power. Therefore, even though a woman cannot be a Talmud-era tax collector, she can be a contemporary mashgihah.
R. Feinstein’s analysis necessarily raises the question of women being ordained as rabbis. For him, the coercive power in the kashrut situation lies with the rabbis; although the mashgihah could be a woman, the rabbis who stand behind her could not. This is supported by the very words that traditionally are used to grant semicha or ordination. The words Yoreh yoreh be’issur veheter (he may direct people in the laws of prohibited and permitted) imply that the rabbi’s word is law when he decides a question of halakha. 28 (Although the very complex discussion of women being ordained as clergy or occupying quasi-clergy positions is beyond the scope of this article, we will point out where the question of serara either challenges or supports those steps.) Here, R. Feinstein’s approach clearly provides an impediment to women’s ordination.
That said, it would seem that R. Feinstein would not, in general, characterize the issue of serara as simply a question of who holds the coercive power. I say that in part because of other of his responsa 29 and because the earlier authorities who discuss this question use additional criteria to measure whether the exercise of power can be considered “coercion.”30
For example, the most frequent explanation for why Deborah could occupy the position she held is that the people of Israel accepted her as their judge,31 as reflected in the biblical verse that reads:32
וַּיַעֲלּו אֵלֶיהָ ּבְנֵי יִׂשְ רָאֵל לַּמִׁשְפָט
And the Jews went up to her for judgment.
This suggests that because the Jews went to her, they affirmatively accepted her rule.33 The claim being made here is that only when power and authority is involuntarily imposed, as in the verse:
שֹום ּתָׂשִ ים עָלֶיָך מֶלְְְך
You shall place upon you a king.
is such a position precluded from being held by a woman. However, if there is willing acceptance by the community, if there is general agreement to recognize the individual as duly occupying the position, and/or if the power of the position is limited by a constitution or by-laws that structure its authority, then the position does not involve serara.
Using these criteria, women would not be precluded from any elected position, particularly if its powers were constitutionally limited. As such, heads of democratic states, synagogue presidents, and committee chairs would all be acceptable tasks for women.
Again, using these criteria, rabbinic ordination would seem to be a bit more problematic. Although it is true that rabbis are “elected” to their positions in synagogues in that they are chosen among candidates, their ordination is not by popular election. In addition, once in the position of mara d’atra (halakhic guide of the place), the rabbi’s halakhic authority is unlimited and is not dependent on an election or on rules democratically decided by the congregation.34
The Adjudicative Function
Tosefot (in four places)35 and Radbaz36 offer the most narrowly defined explanation for Deborah’s acceptability. They claim that Deborah did not actually judge the people with the coercive power of the judiciary. Instead, she taught Torah, and people agreed to follow her teachings. As such, this approach suggests that it is the adjudicating role that creates the problem of women and serara, a problem that Deborah avoided by simply teaching.
In that regard, we should remember that kings were originally appointed to be judges as part of their essential tasks.37 For example, Solomon’s first moment of fame as a king was his adjudicating the case of two women each claiming to be the mother of the same baby.38 King Solomon’s role in the story was clearly that of a judge. As virtually all lay leadership and many religious leadership positions do not involve adjudicating disputes, they do not pose a problem of women exercising serara.
But, again, adjudication is the essence of semikha.39 The two classic examples of ordination today, yoreh yoreh and yadin yadin, both grant adjudicatory powers to the one so ordained.40 Even in the case of the lesser catchall semikha, rav umanhig, rabbis with this ordination are expected to arbitrate disputes that occur in their congregations and may well be asked to serve on rabbinic courts or help with conversions. All of these activities are halakhically considered the purview of judges, not of teachers.
One might suggest that, at least in the congregational setting, members could agree to accept the Torah taught by a woman and follow whatever she said. But such a utopian arrangement is something that rabbis barely dare to dream about and does not reflect the current realities of the life of a communal spiritual leader.
This discussion raises the question of a convert becoming a pulpit rabbi, because, as noted earlier, the serara limitations on women are the same as on converts. I am aware, for example, of a convert who recently sought ordination from Yeshiva University and was told that if he were pursuing employment in the pulpit rather than in education, they would not ordain him.41
Hereditary Positions
Another halakhic criterion for serara can be found among medieval scholars. Sefer Hahinukh bases his understanding of serara on the phrase in the biblical law of the king that says:42
לְמַעַן יַאֲרִיְך יָמִים עַל מַמְלַכְּתֹו הּוא ּובָנָיו ּבְקֶרֶב יִׂשְ רָאֵל
In order that he lengthen his days in his rule, he and his sons in the midst of Israel.
Sefer Hahinukh argues that serara manifests itself in the fact that the position of king is hereditary. Sons follow fathers, and grandsons carry the dynasty on from them. In contrast, lay leadership and even contemporary government positions in democracies do not usually follow that pattern, so there would seem to be a great deal of leeway for women’s leadership here.
Nonetheless, before we see this opinion as granting broad license to women to serve in virtually all communal positions, three points must be made. First, Sefer Hahinukh says that at one time all appointed positions in Israel were dynastic.43 It is not clear that, with a change in the practice of passing down leadership positions, the halakha necessarily follows suit. In other words, positions that were once hereditary may still be closed to women, even if our current practice is not to pass the position from generation to generation.
Second, the rabbinate still retains some elements of hereditary preference. Many chassidic dynasties carry forward from generation to generation, and several Modern Orthodox synagogues have seen the pulpit passed from father to son.44
Third, given that the large majority of medieval poskim, many of whom are authorities of greater stature than Sefer Hahinukh,45 reject this view, it is difficult to simply embrace this position and reject all others.
A Modern Responsum from Rav Uziel
Finally, a responsum of Rav Ben Zion Meir Hai Uziel, the Sephardic chief rabbi of Israel from 1939 to 1954, is quite important to our discussion.46 Rav Uziel discusses the question of women holding office in the newborn State of Israel. He insists that a halakhic prohibition against women holding a position of serara is in force and rejects any attempt to find readings that abrogate its existence. His argument is particularly based on the Rambam’s clear halakhic statement cited earlier that unequivocally records a prohibition.
He does, however, take the position that an election— which represents a choice and acceptance by the people— mitigates these halakhic concerns. Further, he says that women are precluded only from appointed positions, meaning positions appointed by the Sanhedrin, for example, but elected positions simply do not raise any concern.
Rav Uziel also discusses whether a woman in a leadership position violates proper modesty standards. He rejects that idea completely and points out that women and men routinely gather for discussions of serious matters and modesty standards are appropriately maintained.
In short, Rav Uziel stands where many thoughtful ba’alei halakha (halakhic thinkers) in the modern era stand. He recognizes and respects that the push for women to assume positions of authority in contemporary society is very strong. He also recognizes that there are legitimate halakhic opinions that allow women to fill a good number of these positions. At the same time, he acknowledges that there is a halakhic prohibition that may make some positions unattainable by women, at least without modification of the role.
Finally, he challenges those on either extreme. In this regard, he is equally willing to take on those who raise modesty as an issue and those who cite obscure manuscript readings—the former for being too stringent and the latter for being too liberal in their attempt to deal with the question of women and serara. I believe that, like Rav Uziel, we must remain squarely in the mainstream of halakha as we pursue the question of which positions of authority women may occupy and which are closed to them.