In this era of third-stage feminists, cultural feminists, and post-feminism, I often find myself feeling that I am of an older, out-dated generation. Many women today glorify the “women-only” experience. They value the opportunity to create new women’s prayers and religious experiences, while feeling that the liturgy and ceremonies created by men were created for men and do not “speak” to women. My reaction to these ideas is that though most great science, mathematics, music, art, and literature were also discovered and created by men, I will not deny myself participation in these great endeavors of humankind, nor do I feel that they “speak” to men only. Further, I am not interested in living in a womenonly world, creating art, music, and literature that is meant for women only. Similarly, in the religious world, I wish to partake of the vast religious experience, which heretofore was created by men, mostly for men, but based on one Torah that was given to both men and women. I do this with the hope that greater participation by women will eventually influence the continuum of halakhic development.
Beyond my appreciation for our vast Jewish legal system and codes, liturgy and ceremony, is the halakhic aspect of participation by women. So long as we accept the halakhic system as the system by which we live our lives, we are subject to the status that it defines for the mitzvot and for those who observe them. In the halakhic system we follow, only those who are obligated (at the same or higher level 1 ) in a particular mitzvah can perform the mitzvah on behalf of another.2 The lesser obligation or exemption of women in many mitzvot is one of the prime halakhic reasons given for women not being allowed to fulfill public religious positions. Other reasons such as tzniut (need for modesty), pritzut 3 (fear of loose morals), zila milta 4 (undignified behavior), and kevod hatzibbur 5 (honor of the community) are not truly halakhic, but rather values and public policies that, at times, are enacted when halakhic arguments fail to prevent women from fulfilling a particular role that halakhic decisors believed should be reserved for men only. When studying the halakhic literature and codes, we find more allowances for women to perform public functions than is commonly granted today. Further, we find that there is room for redefining what is considered tzniut, pritzut, zila milta, or kevod hatzibbur, according to societal and communal standards 6 .
Let us consider the example of birkat hamazon, the grace after meals. Some women are troubled by the words, al brit’kha shehatamta bivsareinu “for the covenant that you have inscribed on our flesh.” in the second paragraph. They wonder how women can relate to those words. Are they not words composed by men with men in mind? Should not women recite a different text, more appropriate for women?
When one considers changing the text of the statutory prayers and blessings, one must be very aware of the halakhic implications of doing so. The Talmud attributes the composition of the second berakha (for the land) to Joshua 7 . However, though the major elements of birkat hamazon are in place in the Talmud, the specific text evolved over the centuries. Manuscripts and genizah fragments show that the text that is included to mention the covenant (clearly understood to mean circumcision), was much simpler in its early form. In ancient fragments we find the text “we thank You Lord our God for the desirable, good, and spacious land, covenant and Torah” without saying “the covenant that You inscribed on our flesh.8 This simple mention of covenant and Torah are found in the versions of birkat hamazon of Rambam and Sa’adia Gaon and other manuscripts.9
The obligation in birkat hamazon is considered a Torah obligation.10 We learn in the Mishnah that women are obligated in birkat hamazon. 11 However, it is important to realize that there is a dispute in the Talmud whether women’s obligation in birkat hamazon is a rabbinic obligation or a Torah one, and even if it is a Torah one if it is the same obligation as that of men. In Berakhot 20b we find the following question:
Ravina said to Rava: is birkat hamazon d’oraita or d’rabbanan for women?
Rashi (ad. loc.) presents an explanation for why one might think it is only rabbinic for women: it states (Deut. 8:10) “for the good land that God gave to you” and the land was not divided among the females.12 The Or Zarua explains that Rashi held the opinion that women were obligated in birkat hamazon as a Torah obligation, but that their obligation was different from that of men.13 The Tosafot (ad. loc.) disagree with Rashi about the reason for the uncertainty:
But this is surprising! After all, we could present the same difficulty regarding priests and Levites, who also did not take a portion of the land, but we would not say that they cannot fulfill the obligation of birkat hamazon on behalf of others (because of a lesser obligation)! Rather, the reason that there could be uncertainty as far as women’s obligation is because it says “for the covenant that you have inscribed on our flesh and for the Torah that you have taught us,”14 neither of which applies to women, and it says in Berakhot 49a 15 that whoever does not mention the covenant and Torah in birkat hamazon does not fulfill his obligation, so here, because they are not able to mention the covenant and Torah, they are only obligated rabbinically.
However, at the same time, the Tosafot offer an argument that allows inclusiveness of women in obligation but not necessarily in the text:
However, perhaps it could be said that the requirement to mention the covenant and Torah refers only to men, who are obligated in circumcision and Torah, and does not affect women or their obligation, so that they are obligated in birkat hamazon by the Torah just as in any other mitzvot that are not time-bound.
This argument would imply that women have the same level of obligation as men do, but are not required to say the same text. In contrast, according to Rav Hisda, Rav held the opinion that since women are not obligated to say these things in birkat hamazon, neither are men! In Berakhot 49a we find the following dialogue between Rav Hisda and Rabbi Zeira.
Rav Hisda: When I was invited to the Exilarch and I said birkat hamazon, Rav Sheshet straightened his neck to me like a snake (an expression meaning he got very angry with me).
Rabbi Zeira: Why?
Rav Hisda: Because I did not say “the covenant” nor “Torah” nor “(David’s) kingdom”.
Rabbi Zeira: And why did you not say (these)?
Rav Hisda: (I acted) according to Rav Hanan’el in the name of Rav: “whoever did not say ‘the covenant’ and ‘Torah’ and ‘the kingdom fulfilled his obligation.” – “The covenant”, because this is not relevant to women (who are also obligated in birkat hamazon and so it must not be critical to say it), and “Torah” and “kingdom” because they are not relevant to women nor to slaves (who are all obligated in birkat hamazon, and so those elements must also not be critical to completing birkat hamazon).
Rabbi Zeira: And you ignored all of the Tanna’im and Amora’im (who state that you must include those matters in birkat hamazon to fulfill your obligation 16) and did it according to Rav!
According to that dialogue, we understand that women have the same Torah level of obligation as men (otherwise Rav would never have thought what he did and Rav Hisda would never have followed that approach) and we can deduce that Rav thought that men and women could say the same version of birkat hamazon. However, Rav’s allowance for men (to not mention the covenant, the land, and Torah) did not become halakha. It is clear that Rav’s is a minority opinion and that the ruling is that these things have to mentioned as Rebbe, R’ Eliezer, and R’ Abba state.
Thus far, we are left with the possibility that either women are obligated at the same level as men, but do not have to say (or possibly may not say) the same text, or have a lesser obligation than men because the (men’s) text is not relevant to them. In his gloss to the Shulhan Arukh the Rema rules:
Women and slaves do not mention the covenant (circumcision) and Torah, as women are not members of the covenant (i.e., are not circumcised) and slaves are not learned in Torah.17
Though usually Ashkenazi practice is in accordance with the Rema, in this case, the practice is in accordance with the Mishnah Berurah 18 and the Magen Avraham, that women should mention the covenant and Torah in the second paragraph. The Magen Avraham explains ad.loc.:
At the end of chapter 47 (in Orah Hayyim 47, 14), the Shulhan Arukh states that women are obligated to say the berakha for learning Torah and I explain there that this is because they are obligated to learn the mitzvot that are relevant to them. In Yoreh De’ah, chapter 246, 6 (regarding the obligation to learn) I explained that the verse “Thus you shall say to the house of Jacob” that it is referring to the women. If so, why should the women not say “for the Torah that You have taught us”? … they (women) can say “for the covenant that You have inscribed on our flesh” according to those who say that women are as if they are already circumcised.
The notion of a woman being considered as if she is already circumcised derives from an opinion in the gemara (Avodah Zarah 27a) that a woman is considered circumcised even though she has not obviously been circumcised in practice.19
The Implications Today
The gemara in Berakhot asks 20, what are the repercussions of determining whether women and men have the same obligation in birkat hamazon? The gemara explains:
If you say that women are obligated d’oraita, then those who are also obligated d’oraita (free men) can fulfill their obligation (by listening to a woman). But if you say that women are obligated d’rabbanan, then you have the situation of those who are not obligated in this and (we have the rule that) if someone is not obligated (or has a lesser obligation) then s/he cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of others (or a person with greater obligation).21
What are the repercussions of this for us? Why does it matter if women have the same obligation as men, and whether they use the same text? After all, when does any one say birkat hamazon for another? An important repercussion relates to a mixed zimmun. 22 There are two reasons given why men and women cannot form a zimmun together. One is the different level of obligation in birkat hamazon or a different text for it,23 even if the obligation is the same, and the other is pritzut (fear of loose morals). If the first is not an issue (because men and women have the same level of obligation and say the same text), then the matter of pritzut is relatively easy to put aside—many early authorities argue that pritzut is not a problem and only relates to women and slaves in the same company.24 According to the usual understanding of a mishnah in Berakhot 25, normative halakha does not permit a mixed zimmun. However, a very small minority of early authorities understood the mishnah in a different way to conform with a baraita 26 that suggests that women and men can be included in the same zimmun. Women who would prefer a different text are thus playing right into the hands of those halakhic decisors who would prefer a solid halakhic reason never to allow a mixed zimmun, regardless of community norms of pritzut, thereby automatically requiring that only a man lead the zimmun at any mixed gathering. For those of us who envision a time when women and men will have equal halakhic status and can participate together at public events, a unified, collective text of birkat hamazon serves the goal of one Torah for all the Jewish people, rather than a gender-defined Torah for each gender. Separate is not equal.
“A unified collective text of birkat hamazon serves the goal of one Torah for all the Jewish people… ”