The recent proliferation of educated female Orthodox scholars and professionals has brought the halakhic issue of women in leadership positions to the forefront. Women hold high level positions of responsibility in every possible business and profession, are CEOs of their companies, and yet Orthodox Jewish society is slow to accept them as presidents of synagogues. This article examines the biblical and rabbinical sources that underlie this issue as well as several modern day responsa dealing with specific situations of women in leadership.
The biblical source upon which all further discussion is predicated is God’s commandment to Moses in Deuteronomy, “Appoint for yourself a king…”1 The Sifrei (Midrash Halakhah) comments on this verse, “A king, and not a queen.”2 The obligation is specifically to appoint a (male) king; a woman may not be appointed to reign over the people. Rambam takes this logic one step further and writes, “Do not appoint a woman to reign, since the verse states, ‘a king and not a queen.’ And so too, all positions in Israel—do not appoint anyone but a man.”3 For Rambam, the Sifrei’s injunction is expanded to preclude a woman from any position of leadership.
Several early commentators discuss this issue indirectly while analyzing the case of Devorah the Prophet. They invoke the law that women are not allowed to serve as judges and ponder how it is possible that the Tanach records that “Devorah judged Israel in that time?”4 The “problem” of Devorah is brought up in several different Tosafot throughout the Talmud. In Tractate Niddah, 5 Tosafot resolve the problem by maintaining that Devorah did in fact judge, but this case was exceptional, since God had appointed her. Alternatively, it is suggested that she did not judge; she simply taught the Israelites the law. While Devorah’s specific role of judging would seem to run counter to the prohibition of women serving as witnesses and therefore judges,6 it is clear that Devorah is viewed as a powerful leader. Additionally, it is worth noting that the very defense Tosafot give for Devorah is that she was “merely” teaching law to the entire Jewish people.
The Rosh in Shavuot cites the same explanation for Devorah’s judicial role and notes that Devorah was, “teaching the laws of Israel.”7 The Ran on the same passage says even more explicitly, “that which is written about Devorah…is not to say that she judged, but rather that she was a leader. That which the Sifrei states, that you should appoint for yourself a king and not a queen is not a problem, because they did not appoint her, they simply behaved according to her word.”8 Two important points can be observed from the Ran’s statement. First, he contends that she did serve as a leader of the Jewish people, giving us a clear precedent of female public leadership. Furthermore, the Ran introduces a notion that later halakhic authorities develop—there is a distinction between appointing a woman and abiding by her word.
This debate in the sources has clear implications for modern-day rabbis who have to deal with many practical questions of women and leadership. Does the injunction against appointing a woman as king extend to other positions of leadership? Is a distinction made between various types of leadership? One interesting case of leadership that we can examine is that of a mashgiach (supervisor) who oversees kashrut standards. Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked if a woman was halakhically permitted to serve in this capacity. The woman in question was more than qualified for the position and had worked in the field with her husband before his death. She was now a widow with several children and no means of supporting them. Rav Feinstein’s answer is lengthy and complex, but several points he makes are helpful in defining the parameters of leadership.
First, he states that the only forbidden leadership for a woman, is where she is in a position of serarah–ultimate authority. At first glance, he says, the position of mashgiach seems to fall under this rubric since the word of the mashgiach is final. The employer is unable to disregard his word and if the mashgiach declares a food unfit, it may not be eaten. For Rambam, who maintains women should not be appointed to any positions of leadership, it appears that a woman cannot be a mashgicha. But, upon closer inspection, R. Feinstein explains, it becomes apparent that the position does not really entail absolute leadership. In any kashrut organization, the rabbi in charge is the ultimate authority. The various mashgichim who go to restaurants and establishments are simply the rabbi’s workers. The owner of the restaurant is in essence paying the rabbi for the service of maintaining a kosher establishment. Rav Feinstein asks, “Is it not the case that the responsibility that the owner is relying on is on the rav, and she is viewed simply as carrying out the will of the rabbi? She is considered a general worker and he [the rav] can choose to employ a woman.”9 This responsum helps to limit halakhically forbidden leadership roles to those that entail ultimate, nonrevocable authority.
Another distinction that is made by the poskim (religious authorities) revolves around the notion of appointment. In analyzing the sources quoted above that preclude the appointment of a woman to the position of king, some authorities say that it is only forbidden for women to hold positions of leadership which involve an actual appointment. Rav Uziel (the Sephardi Chief Rabbi contemporary with Rav Kook), points this out in his responsum addressing the issue of permitting women to run for government office. He posits, “The law refers only to appointments made by a Sanhedrin, but in our case there is no appointment. Rather, it is acceptance—through voting, the majority of the community has chosen this person…and in this case, even Rambam would agree that there is nothing at all which is forbidden.”10
Rav Uziel also states that Devorah was certainly allowed to be a judge in the sense of teaching and instructing, and quotes the Ran’s proviso that Devorah was a leader and not a judge, which is perfectly acceptable. After making many cogent halakhic arguments, the last point in this responsa is not a halakhic one, yet it reveals an important philosophy behind the author’s methodology in deciding legal rulings. He writes, “Perhaps there is still room to say that although from a halakhic perspective their accepting her [into office] is all right, from the perspective of mussar and modesty there still remains something forbidden.”11 He then dismisses this possibility, stating, “Mussar and the Torah are one thing, and we can say about this topic that after we learn the Torah does not forbid anything except explicit appointment, we can assume that there is nothing forbidden in terms of pritzut (licentiousness).”12 The message of this statement is quite clear. There is no room to make a new moral code independent of halakha even if something feels uncomfortable.
What about the case of a woman serving as president of a synagogue board? In America many congregational rabbis have allowed women to sit on synagogue boards. Numerous Orthodox congregations have women officers: in some congregations all offices are open to women, in others women can hold most offices. A few Orthodox synagogues have had female presidents. It was almost thirty years ago that Rabbi Seymour Turk wrote in Ha-Darom 13 that there is no reason why a woman cannot fulfill the role of synagogue president. He pointed out that even according to Rambam the only problem is appointing a woman to a position which involves autonomy and the ability to force others to do her will. Our synagogues today in no way fit this description. In fact he wrote, “In our congregations, the president is simply putting into action what the congregation decides. This is not authority, rather it is doing their work [bidding].”14 Furthermore, Rabbi Turk explained, when the people vote a woman into office they are clearly accepting her, thereby precluding the problem of the halakhic definition of appointing a woman. He also added some additional dimensions to the concept of serarah. According to Rabbi Turk, “ultimate authority” only applies when leaders can hold on to their positions until the day they die and pass those positions on to their children. This is clearly not applicable to the case of a woman who serves as president of a synagogue.15
Thus, while a rabbi has to seriously consider the weight of “A king and not a queen” and the extension of its application to different positions of leadership and public office in rabbinic sources, it is clear that few public roles are closed to women today on the basis of halakha. Many poskim have concluded that if a woman is accepted as leader rather than being appointed, this is not the type of absolute authority that the earlier authorities intended to forbid. They have also maintained that if a woman has to answer to someone else such as a rabbi or fellow congregants, this too is not absolute authority. Thus, the analogy with kingship is not relevant to our modern-day synagogues. One should not use the issue of modesty to extend the halakhic limitations on a woman holding public office. Discomfort with change should not prevent women from serving in many of the leadership positions available in religious life today.